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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Plagued by an ever growing mountain of debt, an individual may find himself with no 
other choice than to file a petition with the bankruptcy court.  Filing a petition starts the process 
by which a debtor may receive a discharge from certain debts that arose before the petition was 
filed, subject to certain exceptions.1  In order to receive a discharge a debtor must comply with 
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code including filing a schedule of assets and liabilities.2  
Some of the assets listed may be exempted and retained by the debtor to help start anew.3  Others 
will be sold by the trustee and the proceeds used to pay off creditors.4  Specific substantive rules 
govern the process through which assets are either sold or exempted under the Bankruptcy 
Code.5  Procedural rules, defined in the Bankruptcy Code and supplemented by the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure provide additional guidance to debtors and trustees regarding the time 
frame for claiming and objecting to property claimed as exempt.6  The Bankruptcy rules are 
promulgated by the Supreme Court rather than Congress.  “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.”7 
Courts have generally looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & 
Kronz, to determine whether a debtor may retain assets listed as exempt if the trustee fails to 
follow these specific procedural rules, which are designed to effectuate efficiency in the 
bankruptcy process.8  In Taylor, the Court held the trustee’s failure to object within FRBR 
4003(b)’s 30-day requirement rendered the property fully exempt even though the debtor had no 
                                                 
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). 
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(B)(i). 
3 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
4 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
5 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
6 See discussion infra Part I.B.   
7 28 U.S.C. § 2075. 
8 See generally Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
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colorable basis for claiming the proceeds of the lawsuit as exempt.9  In the 18 years since this 
decision was announced, bankruptcy and appellate courts have differed as to its holding, 
meaning, context and application.10  For example, the Eight Circuit has held that Taylor does not 
apply where the debtor intends to only partially exempt an asset claimed as exempt, but only 
where the debtor claims the full amount as exempt.11  In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that 
Taylor requires the trustee to object where a debtor lists an identical entry for the property’s 
value and the amount of the exemption, otherwise the property is fully exempt.12  The Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari in In re Reilly to clarify ambiguities that have developed in applying 
Taylor.13  Implementation of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Wick is consistent with the 
plain meaning of the exemption provisions, accounts for the specific monetary limitations as well 
as the standard for valuation of exemptions imposed by Congress and better effectuates the 
purposes and polices of the Bankruptcy Code 
This Comment examines the Bankruptcy Code’s exemption statute, Section 522, 
specifically whether a debtor may exempt property in its entirety merely by indicating that the 
value of the property is identical to the claimed exemption.  Part I of this Comment provides a 
brief overview of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.  This Part also provides an 
overview of the Bankruptcy Code’s exemption statute, its procedure and application.  Part II.A 
analyzes Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, a Supreme Court decision interpreting the exemption 
provision and FRPB 4003(b).  Part II.B discusses the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Wick, 
which rejects the proposition that one exempts an asset in its entirety by listing both the value of 
the property and the value of the exemption as unknown.  Part II.C discusses the Third Circuit’s 
                                                 
9 Id. at 642-44.  See also discussion infra Part II.A.  
10 See discussion infra Part II. 
11 See In Re Wick, 276 F.3d 412 (8th Cir. 2002).  
12 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2008). 
13 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2009) (No. 08-538).   
 4 
decision in In re Reilly, which holds that a debtor signals her intention to exempt property “in 
kind” by listing identical entries for the value of the property and the amount of the claimed 
exemption.  Part III argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in accordance 
with In re Wick because this standard is more consistent with the plain language of the 
Bankruptcy Code, its policies and procedure. 
I.  THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
A.  Policy 
 Article I § 8 grants Congress the power to establish uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.14  Bankruptcy laws were believed by the Framers to 
be incorporated in the Constitution because of problems that varying state laws caused for 
creditors and interstate commerce.15  The central focus of this Comment is a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case, which allows a debtor to discharge all of his or her debts that arose before the 
commencement of the case.16   In exchange for a general discharge, the debtor is required to turn 
over all nonexempt property to the trustee for sale and distribution according to a structured 
priority scheme.17  The Bankruptcy Code attempts to balance two competing objectives in a 
Chapter 7 case: fair distribution of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors and to provide 
debtor’s a “fresh start.”18  The Code effectuates these policies through its various provisions. 
 In order to provide debtors a “fresh start” the Bankruptcy Code entitles a debtor to 
exempt certain property so that it will not be available to his or her creditors.19  “The purpose of 
exemptions is to make possible the debtor’s fresh start by allowing him or her to keep those 
                                                 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.   
15 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. LEV. 5, 13 
(1995).   
16 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727. 
17 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 522, 541, 542. 
18  
19 See generally, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).  See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
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items of property deemed reasonably necessary to daily life.  They preserve the debtor’s dignity 
and give the debtor some basis upon which to build a new life.”20  The Code balances the need 
for providing a debtor with a “fresh start” against the equally important principle of equal 
treatment of creditors.  For example, Section 522 places certain monetary amounts on claimed 
exemptions that a debtor may take.21  Additionally, to provide equal distribution to creditors, the 
Bankruptcy Code allows remaining property of the estate to be sold and divided among 
creditors.22  Creditors are not necessarily treated “equally” across the board; rather, certain 
creditors such as secured creditors are given priority treatment over all unsecured creditors as to 
their secured collateral.23  As for unsecured creditors, the Code provides a priority scheme that 
allows specific unsecured creditors, such as domestic support obligations, to be paid in full 
before general unsecured creditors.24   As the Supreme Court stated in Williams v. U.S. Fid. & 
Guar. Co., “[i]t is the purpose of the bankrupt[cy] act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into 
cash for distribution among creditors, and then to relive the honest debtor from the weight of 
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and 
responsibilities consequent upon . . . . misfortunes.  And nothing is better settled than that 
statutes should be sensibly construed with a view to effectuating the legislative intent.”25 
B.  Procedure 
                                                 
20  2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2.05. 
21 See generally, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).   
22 See generally, 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).  If a secured creditor’s claim exceeds the value of the collateral, they are allowed an 
unsecured claim and gave no priority over other unsecured claims.  Id. However, if the value of the property exceeds 
the amount of a secured creditor’s claim, the secured creditor is entitled to interest, reasonable fees, costs, or other 
charges provided in their security agreement.  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). 
24 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(b), 507(a).   
25 See 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915) (citations omitted).   
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 A debtor commences a case by filing a petition for relief with the bankruptcy court.26  
Once a petition is filed a bankruptcy estate arises by operation of law comprised of “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”27  Property of 
the estate is then subject to sale and distribution for the benefit of creditors.28  To effectuate the 
Bankruptcy Code’s policy of a fresh start, the Code provides that debtors may exempt certain 
property from sale and distribution for the benefit of creditors.29  Section 522 allows a debtor to 
choose between the federal exemption statute, Section 522(d), or their states’ exemption statute.  
Additionally, Section 522(b)(2) allows a state to “opt out” of the federal exemption provisions by 
statute.30  A majority of states have chosen to “opt out” of the federal exemption scheme, thereby 
denying their citizens the right to elect the federal exemptions.31  In fact, many states exemption 
statutes reduce the amount of applicable exemptions compared to the federal statute.32  For 
purposes of this Comment, references will be made to the federal exemption statute. 
The federal exemption statute lists classes of property that a debtor may exempt. For 
example, the statute allows a debtor to exempt, among other things, real or personal property that 
the debtor uses as a residence (homestead exemption), an interest in one motor vehicle, 
                                                 
26 11 U.S.C. § 301(a).   
27 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).   
28 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 726(a).   
29 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522.  See also Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for 
Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 515, 543 (1991) (“Under principles of 
distributive justice, each individual in our society is entitled to a level of human dignity.  In order to achieve that 
dignity the individual must be provided with a minimum level of subsistence and the opportunity to provide himself 
and his family without the burden of overwhelming debt.”) 
30 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). § 522 provides that a state may “opt-out” of the federal exemption statute by 
specifically enacting a statute that does not authorize debtors domiciled in the state to use the federal exemptions.  § 
522(b)(2). 
31 See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.05.  The following states have elected under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) “opt out” of 
the federal exemption scheme: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
West Virginia and Wyoming.  Id. at note 5.  
32 Id.  But cf. infra note 34. 
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household goods, jewelry, tools of the trade, health aids and life insurance policies.33  On its face 
the exemption statute seems quite generous, but for certain types of exempt property a maximum 
amount is stated capping the allowable exemption.34  For instance, a debtor’s homestead 
exemption is limited to $20,200 in value and her interest in a motor vehicle may not exceed 
$3,225.35  Subject to limited exceptions, property exempted under Section 522 is not liable 
during or after the case for any debt that arose before the commencement of the case.36 
 In order to claim an applicable exemption a debtor must file a list of property claiming to 
be exempt.37  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007 directs the debtor to file a schedule of 
assets on Official Form 6C, titled “Schedule C – Property Claimed as Exempt” (hereinafter 
“Schedule C”).38  Schedule C requires the debtor to describe the property, specify the law 
providing each exemption, state the value of the claimed exemption and the current value of the 
property without deducting the exemption.39  Because exemption provisions are often limited 
according to the nature of the property (or its value) the information provided by Schedule C is 
essential to evaluate the propriety of the claimed exemption.40  Section 522 provides that unless a 
                                                 
33 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).  
34 See id. § 522(d).  If a married couple is filing jointly, § 522(m) permits them to double their allowable exemptions.  
35 Id. § 522(d)(1)-(2).  In some regards, it may prove advantageous to choose a state’s exemption statute over the 
federal exemptions.  For example, § 522(d)(1) limits the homestead exemption to $20,200, while Texas allows a 
homestead, consisting of not more than 10 acres of land, to be exempted in full.  See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 
41.001 (Vernon 2005).  To combat potential problems associated with conversion of non-exempt assets into exempt 
assets, particularly with regard to unlimited homestead exemptions, Congress enacted § 522(o) (reducing the value 
of an interest in real property “to the extent that such value is attributable to any portion of any property that the 
debtor disposed of in the 10-year period ending on the date of the filing of the petition with the intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not exempt, or that portion that the debtor could not exempt, 
under subsection (b), if on such date the debtor had held the property so disposed of,”) and § 522(p) (limiting the 
debtor’s interest in homestead to $136,875 if the debtor acquired the homestead within 1,215 days of the date of 
filing the petition)). 
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).   
37 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).   
38 See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.  In a voluntary case, Schedule C must be filed with the petition or within 
14 days thereafter.  In an involuntary case Schedule C is required to be filed by the debtor within 14 days of the 
entry of the order for relief.  Id. 
39 See Official Form 6C. 
40 See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.05. 
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party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on the list is exempt.41  Bankruptcy Rule 
4003(b) provides that a “party in interest may file an objection to the list of property claimed as 
exempt within 30-days after the meeting of creditors held under § 341(a) is concluded or within 
30-days after any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is filed, whichever is later.”42   
If the debtor has fraudulent asserted an exemption, the rule allows the trustee to file an objection 
at any time prior to one year after the closing of the case.43  As discussed infra Part II, the 
bankruptcy courts have divided about the proper interpretation of Section 522 and the FRBP 
4003. 
II.  TAYLOR V. FREELAND & KRONZ AND ITS PROGENY 
 In order to more fully understand the circuit split discussed infra, an examination of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the interplay between Section 522 and FRBP 4003 is 
necessary.  In Taylor, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a trustee may 
contest the validity of an exemption after the 30-day period provided by FRBP 4003, even if the 
debtor has no colorable basis for claiming the exemption.44  Under a plain meaning approach the 
Court held that a trustee may not contest the validity of the exemption after the 30-day period.45  
Slightly modified factual variations have led to different interpretations of this decision among 
bankruptcy courts.46 
A.  Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz 
                                                 
41 11 U.S.C. § 522(l).  
42 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). 
43 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(2).  This section was added to the rules in 2008.  The Advisory Committee notes 
that “[e]xtending the deadline for trustees to object to an exemption when the exemption claim has been fraudulently 
made will permit the court to review and, in proper circumstances, deny improperly claimed exemptions, thereby 
protecting the legitimate interests of creditors and the bankruptcy estate.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(2) advisory 
committee’s notes. 
44 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
45 Id. 
46 See discussion infra Parts II.B and C. 
 9 
 In Taylor, the debtor, Emily Davis, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in October of 
1984.47  At this time the debtor was also engaged in protracted state court litigation with her 
former employer, Trans World Airlines (TWA), for employment discrimination on the basis of 
race and sex.48  On her exemption schedules, Davis listed the expected proceeds from the lawsuit 
against TWA as exempt, listing its value as “unknown.”49  The trustee did not object to the 
claimed exemption.50  Davis received a discharge on October 16, 1985.51  Subsequently, TWA 
settled with Davis on the issue of damages, agreeing to pay her $110,000.52  A portion of this 
payment was made to her attorneys for their fees.53  After learning of the settlement, the trustee 
instituted an action against the debtor and her attorneys to turn the money over to the bankruptcy 
estate; the debtor in turn argued that the money was exempt as she had previously indicated on 
her schedules.54 
 The bankruptcy court construed the language of § 522(l) as containing an additional 
requirement that there be a statutory basis for a claimed exemption before the failure of any party 
in interest to timely object has any legal effect.55  After ruling that the basis of the suit was in tort, 
rather than for lost wages, the bankruptcy court held that because there was no statutory basis for 
                                                 
47 Id. at 640. 
48 Id.  In 1980, Davis secured a ruling in her favor on the issue of liability from the Pittsburgh Human Relations 
Commission, a damage award was pending.  On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, the 
Commission’s decision was reversed.  However, the decision of the Commission was reinstated after a favorable 
ruling for Davis in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.  After Davis filed her Chapter 7 petition, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  In re Davis, 105 B.R. 288, 290-91 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Pa. (1989).  
49 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 640.  At the Section 341 meeting of creditors, Davis’ lawyers informed the trustee that 
they estimated Davis may win $90,000 in her lawsuit against TWA.  The trustee opined that the proceeds of the 
lawsuit were property of the estate under Section 541, but doubted that the lawsuit had any value.  Id. at 640-41.   
50 Id.  
51In re Davis, 105 B.R. at 291. 
52 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 641. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. The trustee brought this proceeding 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), which allows the trustee to avoid a transfer of property 
of the estate that occurs after the commencement of the case, and 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), which allows recovery by the 
trustee, after avoidance under § 549, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred from the initial transferee 
or any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.  In re Davis, 105 B.R. at 292. 
55 In re Davis, 105 B.R. at 292. 
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permitting an exemption for tort recovery, the money was ordered to be returned to the trustee.56  
This decision was affirmed by the district court.57  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed holding 
that “in the absence of an objection filed within thirty days after the section 341(a) creditor’s [sic] 
meeting or the filing of an amendment to the exemption list, property claimed as exempt by the 
debtor is exempt.”58  Because no party in interest objected to the claimed exemption, the 
proceeds of the lawsuit were exempt.59 
 Interpreting section 522(l) and FRBP 4003(b) the Supreme Court ruled even though the 
debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the proceeds of her lawsuit as exempt, the trustee’s 
failure to object within the time prescribed by FRBP 4003(b) is determinative, and he may not 
thereafter challenge the validity of the exemption.60  The Court’s opinion was a pragmatic one.  
According to the Court, “[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to 
act and they produce finality.”61  The Court said that if the trustee is unaware of the potential 
value of the claimed exemption he could have asked for a hearing on the issue, or asked for an 
extension of time.62  The trustee argued that such a rule will create improper incentives and 
encourage debtors to claim improper exemptions on the chance that a party in interest will fail to 
                                                 
56 Id. at 294.  If the debtor’s lawsuit had been considered one for lost wages, § 522(d)(11) provides that the debtor 
may exempt her right to receive “a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an individual 
of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any 
dependent of the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E). 
57 In re Davis 118 B.R. 272 (WD Pa. 1990). 
58 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Third Circuit surveyed and examined three 
approaches taken by courts in ruling on the matter.  The first, a literal approach that strictly enforces the 30 day 
requirement; second, a requirement that a claimed exemption must have a statutory basis in order to be exempt if no 
party in interest objects within the 30 day period (adopted by the bankruptcy court in this matter); and third, a good 
faith statutory basis standard, which allows a court to uphold the claimed exemption if there is a good faith basis for 
it (the standard previously adopted by the 6th and 8th Circuits). Id. at 423-24 (citations omitted).   
59 Id. at 426. 
60 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 642-44.  
61 Id. at 644. 
62 Id.  Rule 4003(b) permits a party in interest to ask the bankruptcy court for an extension of time.  See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
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object.63  However, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Code adequately covered improper 
conduct.  For example, § 727(a)(4)(B) authorizes a denial of discharge if the debtor knowingly 
and fraudulently presented or used a false claim and 18 U.S.C. § 152, which imposes criminal 
penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases.64 
 In the end, the Court’s ruling in Taylor led to a split among the Circuits and paved the 
way to allow some unscrupulous conduct and gamesmanship by debtors depending on the 
jurisdiction in which they reside. 
B.  In Re Wick 
 In In re Wick, the debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in July of 1997.65  On 
Schedule C, the debtor described the property as stock options, exempt under the wildcard 
provision of Section 522(d)(5).66  The debtor listed the current value of the property as 
“unknown” and the value of the claimed exemption as “unknown.”67  At the meeting of creditors, 
the trustee received copies of the employment agreement that detailed the aforementioned stock 
options, but did not object at that time.68  The debtor received a discharge in November of 
1997.69  In October of 1998, the debtor filed suit against her former company requesting a court-
ordered buyout of the stock.70  The state court granted the buyout and valued the options at 
                                                 
63 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644. 
64 Id.   
65 See, In Re Wick, 276 F.3d 412, 413 (8th Cir. 2002). 
66 Id. at 414. 
67 Id.  The stock options stemmed from the sale of the debtor’s company and required her to remain employed by the 
company for one year.  At issue in this case, not pertinent to our discussion, was what portion of the stock options 
became part of the bankruptcy estate under Section 541(a)(1), which includes in the estate all legal and equitable 
interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case, and what portion would be assigned to the 
debtor as earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case under 
Section 541(a)(6).  The court held that the bankruptcy estate’s interest was limited to the pro rata portion of the 
proceeds, from the liquidation sale of the stock options that are related to the debtor’s pre-petition services.  The 
court further determined that one third represented the pro rata portion that the estate was entitled to as pre-petition 
earnings.  Id. at 415-17.   
68 Id. at 414. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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$97,200.71  The trustee then petitioned to re-open the debtor’s bankruptcy case, demanding 
turnover of the $97,200 less the $3,925 exemption to which she was entitled.72 
 In a well-reasoned opinion the bankruptcy court held that Taylor was not applicable.73 
Because the debtor listed a valid statutory basis for the exemption claimed (unlike the debtor in 
Taylor) she “indicated that she did not intend to claim an exemption any greater than the dollar 
value allowed by that particular statute [§ 522(d)(5)].”74  As such, the trustee’s failure to object 
did not turn the exemption into one for the entire asset rather than the specified dollar limit.75  
The district court reversed finding Taylor to be directly applicable.76  According to the district 
court, because the trustee made no objection to the exemption claimed within the 30-day time 
period, the stock options became exempt in full.77 
 Reversing the decision of the district court, the Eighth Circuit rejected the contention that 
listing the current value of the property as “unknown” is sufficient to make an asset fully 
exempt.78  Instead, the court reasoned that it “may signal nothing more than that the asset has not 
been valued or that the debtor is unsure of how to come up with an accurate market value.”79  
The court went on to explain that “when a specific dollar figure given by statute limited the 
amount of the exemption, and the trustee did not forsake an interest in the options, either through 
inadvertence or misjudgment, listing “unknown” does not, by itself, render the options fully 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 See, In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 414.  The $3,925 amount represents the amount that the debtor had remaining under 
Section 522(d)(5) that she could have used to exempt “any property” under the wildcard provision “[g]iven the 
dollar limitations then applicable and the other items claimed as exempt under § 522(d)(5).”  See In re Wick, 249 
B.R. 900, 905 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 2000).  Each dollar amount listed in Section 522 is subject to change every three 
years to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, published by the Department of 
Labor.  11 U.S.C. § 104.   
73 See, In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 418. 
74 See In re Wick, 249 B.R. at 913. 
75 Id.  The bankruptcy court went on to posit that the trustee had no basis for objecting to the claimed exemption 
because it was valid and within the allowed dollar amount.   
76 See In re Wick, 256 B.R. 618, 625 (D. Minn. 2001). 
77 Id. 
78 See In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 416. 
79 Id. 
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exempt.”80  The Court reasoned that Taylor did not apply because Wick intended to only 
partially exempt the claimed asset, in contrast to Taylor who, in fact, claimed the full amount as 
exempt.81  Consequently, the stock options were partially exempt up to $3,925 and the resulting 
proceeds were property of the estate.82   
C.  In Re Reilly and Exemptions “In Kind” 
 The Third Circuit also had the opportunity to interpret Taylor after a trustee failed to 
object to a claimed exemption within the 30-day period.  In Reilly, the debtor filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition in April of 2005.83  The debtor claimed an exemption in certain business 
equipment used for her catering business.84  On Schedule C, the debtor indicated the current 
value of the property as $10,718.85  She listed the value of the claimed exemption also as 
$10,718, “asserting $1,850 of it under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) and $8,868 under 11 U.S.C. § 
522(d)(5).”86  No objection was made by the trustee or a party in interest within the 30-day time 
period of Rule 4003(b).87 
 Subsequently, the trustee had the business equipment appraised for $17,200.88  On 
August 10, 2005, the trustee moved to sell the business equipment, subject to the debtor’s partial 
                                                 
80 Id.  See also In re Cormier, 382 B.R. 377, 405 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (interpreting Wick as standing “for the 
proposition that when there exists a specific dollar limit in the statute, listing the current market value [in column 4 
of Schedule C] does not result in the asset become fully exempt.”  Id. 
81 See In re Wick, 276 F.3d at 417-18. 
82 Id. See also note 60, supra. 
83 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 174.   
84 Id.   
85 Id. 
86 Id. Section 522(d)(6) allows a debtor to exempt up to $2,025 in value, in any implements, professional books, or 
tools, of the trade of the debtor.  Section 522(d)(5), commonly known as the “wildcard provision”, allows a debtor to 
exempt her interest in any property, not to exceed in value $1,075 plus up to $10,125 of any unused amount of the 
exemption under Section 522(d)(1) (the homestead exemption).  These figures indicated in this footnote reflect the 
dollar amounts allowed as of April 2007, not the relevant 2005 figures applicable when this debtor filed.  Dollar 
amounts are adjusted periodically and will change again in March 2010.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) note 1.   
87 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174. 
88 Id. 
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exemption.89  The debtor, citing Taylor, argued that the business equipment was fully exempt 
because the trustee failed to object, and thus was not subject to liquidation and distribution.  The 
bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor, and determined that the property was fully exempt.90  
The district court for the middle district of Pennsylvania denied the appeal.91  The trustee 
appealed to the Third Circuit. 
 On appeal, the Third Circuit framed the issue as follows: “whether a Chapter 7 trustee 
who does not lodge a timely objection to a debtor’s exemption of personal property may 
nevertheless move to sell the property if he later learns that the property value exceeds the 
amount of the claimed exemption.”92  The trustee argued that Taylor was not controlling because 
it did not address whether a debtor’s valuation of property claimed as exempt becomes 
conclusive in the absence of a timely objection.93  After recognizing a split of authority, the 
Third Circuit disagreed, reasoning that Taylor stands for the proposition that “where the debtor 
signals her intention to exempt certain property in its entirety by listing an identical entry for the 
property’s value and the amount of the exemption, the trustee must object pursuant to Rule 4003 
lest the property be rendered fully exempt.”94  According to the court, because the debtor listed 
the value of the business equipment as $10,718, and the amount of the claimed exemption as 
$10,718, the trustee was on notice that the debtor intended to exempt the property in full.95  
Having notice of the debtor’s intention, the trustee should have had the business equipment 
                                                 
89 In re Reilly, 403 B.R. 336, 337 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
90 Id. 
91 See generally, In Re Reilly, 403 B.R. 336 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
92 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174.  
93 Id. at 178.   
94 Id. at 179.   
95 Id. at 178. 
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appraised, sought a hearing under 4003(c)96 or requested an extension of time.97  The trustee’s 
failure to object rendered the property fully exempt, regardless of the property’s ultimate market 
value.98 
 The Third Circuit does not stand alone in its interpretation of Taylor.  The Eleventh 
Circuit and a Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel also share this interpretation.  In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation is in accordance with the First and Ninth Circuits.99  The 
circuit split along with the gamesmanship invited by the Third Circuits holding and the practical 
implications makes this issue ripe for determination.  Indeed, the Supreme Court agrees and has 
granted the trustee’s petition for writ of certiorari.100  
III.  THE DECISION 
 Taylor has been universally recognized and applied by bankruptcy courts.  On appeal to 
the Supreme Court, neither party in In re Reilly argues that Taylor should be overruled; rather, 
they disagree as to the application of the decision.101  The Court’s decision will depend 
significantly on interpreting the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions and distinguishing its decision in 
Taylor.  The issue presented must be decided by the Court in accordance with the plain meaning 
of the text.  In addition, each section must not be read in isolation, rather the statute’s full text, 
language and structure must be accounted for to properly implement the intent of Congress. 
A.  In re Reilly Fails to Give Effect to the Language of the Statute 
                                                 
96 This subsection governs any objection made by a party in interest under FRBP 4003.  A party objecting to an 
exemption bears the burden of proof to show that the exemption is not properly claimed.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
4003(c).   
97 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 178. 
98 Id. 
99 See generally, In re Green, 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994); In re Anderson, 377 B.R. 865 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007); In 
re Hyman, 967 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Barroso-Herrans, 524 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2008).   
100 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2009) (No. 08-538).    
101 Brief of Petitioner at 26, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 08-538 (July 10, 2009) (arguing that Taylor is distinguishable 
from the case at hand and the court of appeals’ holding that Taylor controls the disposition of this matter 
misunderstands the facts and reasoning of that decision);  Brief for Respondent, at 2-3, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 08-
538 (Sept. 18, 2009) (arguing that this case is a nearly identical issue and presents an “even more compelling 
candidate for the same result.”).  
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 In order to resolve the dispute over the meaning of Section 522(l), the language of the 
statute must be first examined.102  Where the meaning of the statute is unambiguous, then the 
inquiry has ended and the sole function of the court is to enforce the statute according to its 
terms.103  Every word of the statute shall be given effect.104  “The plain meaning of legislation 
should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases in which the literal application of a statute’ will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’”105 
 The relevant language at issue is Section 522(l), which reads as follows: “The debtor 
shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section.  
If the debtor does not file such a list, a dependent of the debtor may file such a list, or may claim 
property as exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the debtor.  Unless a party in interest 
objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”106  Bankruptcy Rule 4003 gives 
an interested party, specifically the trustee, 30-days from the Section 341(a) meeting of creditors 
to object to the list of property claimed as exempt.107  The language of Section 522(l) is 
unambiguous and should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.  Taylor v. Freeland & 
Kronz determined this statute and its clarifying rule to be unambiguous and therefore, applied its 
plain meaning.   
 In Taylor, the debtor claimed certain property as exempt, to wit, the expected proceeds 
from an employment discrimination claim against her former employer.108  The trustee failed to 
object within the time prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b).109  Consequently, the Court ruled 
                                                 
102 See U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
103 Id.  (interpreting § 506(b) to authorize payment of post petition interest on allowed nonconsensual oversecured 
claims).   
104 See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993).   
105 Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (italics supplied). 
107 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003.   
108 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 640. 
109 Id. 
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that by operation of Section 522(l) (in conjunction with Rule 4003(b)), the property claimed as 
exempt was exempt, even though the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the 
exemption.110  This is the holding of Taylor, as it was the only issue addressed by the Court.111   
 Applying the foregoing to the facts of In re Reilly, the Court should come to a similar 
conclusion.  In In re Reilly, the debtor claimed certain property as exempt, to wit, business 
equipment.112  Just as the trustee in Taylor, the trustee failed to object within the time prescribed 
by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b).  However, the difference between Taylor and In re Reilly is the 
consequence of the trustee’s failure to object.113  In Taylor, the trustee lodged an untimely 
objection to the property, because the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming it.114  Under a 
plain meaning approach to Section 522(l), the trustee’s failure to object to the property rendered 
the property exempt.115  Thus the Court performed its proper function enforcing the statute 
according to its terms.116  In contrast, the debtor’s claimed exemption in In re Reilly was proper 
under Section 522(d)(5)’s wildcard provision and Section 522(d)(6)’s professional tools 
exemption.117  In In Re Reilly the trustee did not object to the property, but rather to the valuation 
of the property as claimed by the debtor.118  Accordingly, no objection under Section 522(l) was 
proper or even required as the Third Circuit held.119  Any other reading fails to give effect to the 
language of the statute. 
                                                 
110 Id. at 643-44.   
111 Id. at 641 (As stated by the Court, the only issue was “whether the trustee may contest the validity of an 
exemption after the 30-day period if the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption.”).  Id. 
112 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 176. 
113 See discussion supra, Part II.A.  [possible discussion in this footnote as to why Taylor is factually wrong] 
114 Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644. 
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l)  
116 See supra note 85. 
117 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5)-(6).   
118 See discussion supra Part II.C.  
119 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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 The trustee in In re Reilly (or for that matter any trustee in a similar situation where the 
debtor properly claims an exemption) had no basis to object under Section 522(l).  The 
bankruptcy court in In re Wick made this same point. “The issue at hand is the valuation of the 
property claimed exempt, not the validity of the exemption.  The Trustee does not have and 
could not have, an objection to the validity of Wick’s exemption because [§ 522(d)(5)] allows 
her to exempt any type of property.” 120  The Third Circuit’s interpretation of Section 522(l) 
expands the scope of the statute beyond its plain meaning.  According to the Third Circuit, not 
only does Section 522(l) require the debtor to file a list of property claimed as exempt, it also 
requires the debtor to file a list of the value of such property.  Section 522(l) simply does not 
require this result. 
While it may be true that Schedule C requires the debtor to describe the property as well 
as the value of the claimed exemption and the current value of the property without deducting the 
exemption, the statute, Section 522(l), does not require the debtor to do so.121  Bankruptcy Rule 
9009 provides that Official Forms prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States 
shall be observed and used.122  However, these rules and forms shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right.123  The Third Circuit’s transformed the language of Section 522(l) 
as follows: if a party in interest objects to anything listed on Schedule C, including the value of 
the claimed exemption, he or she must object or the property and its attendant value figures are 
determinative and controlling.  In In re Reilly, the debtor interprets Section 522(l) one step 
                                                 
120 In re Wick, 249 B.R. 900, 913 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 2000).  See also In re Hyman, 967 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1992) (indicating on similar facts that the trustee had no basis for objection, and if he had objected the trustee may 
have suffered the judge’s “ire” because the debtor’s were clearly entitled to the exemption); Brief of the National 
Association of Bankruptcy Trustees as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, at 11-13, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 
08-538 (Sept. 18, 2009) (arguing that requiring a trustee to object to a properly claimed exemption simply because 
the exemption claimed equals the listed value would make a mockery out of any notion of efficiency that the official 
forms strive to achieve). 
121 See generally Official Form 6C. 
122 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009. 
123 28 U.S.C. § 2075. 
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further, stating that “[a] trustee who wishes to preserve any potential right to deprive a debtor of 
an asset claimed as exempt must object where, as here, the debtor does not concede in his or her 
schedules that the value of the relevant assets exceeds the amount claimed as exempt.”124  Such a 
reading is prohibited by the language of Section 522(l) itself and surely would abridge, enlarge 
or modify substantive rights of both parties in interest and debtors in contravention of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2075.125  Under the Third Circuit’s interpretation, a debtor’s substantive right to exempt 
property would be enlarged, beyond what Section 522(d) allows.  Substantive rights of creditors 
to have property sold and proceeds distributed to them would also be diminished.  This 
interpretation is not sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules or Schedule C for 
that matter. 
The information provided by Schedule C may be nothing more than an administrative 
convenience to the trustee, helping him or her evaluate the propriety of the claimed exemption.126  
At least one court has agreed: 
The fourth column requires the debtor to state “Current Value of Property 
Without Deducting Exemption.”  This information is not required by § 
522.  This court believes the total value of the property in Column 4, as 
contrasted to the value (amount) claimed as exempt in Column 3, is likely 
included for the administrative convenience of the parties in interest.  By 
comparing the figures in Column 3 and Column 4, one can easily see 
whether (according to the debtor’s value estimation) the property may be 
administered for the benefit of the estate. . . . The current value “bonus 
information in Column 4 of Schedule C may not be used, and should not 
be used, to determine “the property claimed as exempt” for purposes of § 
522(l).127 
                                                 
124 Brief for Respondent at 38, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 08-538 (Sept. 18, 2009).  It should be noted that assets are 
property of the estate under Section 541(a) as of commencement of the case, they no longer property belonging to 
the debtor.  The trustee does not have merely a potential right to the property, he has an absolute right to the 
property that is property of the estate.  
125 See discussion supra, Part I.B.  
126 See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.05.  See also Brief of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, at 11, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 08-538 (Sept. 18, 2009) (arguing that the 
forms used in bankruptcy proceedings produce efficiency, minimize costs and expenses and speeds up the decision 
making process).   
127 In re Cormier, 382 B.R. 377, 395 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 
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 Other courts have wrongly extended Taylor.  The Ninth Circuit BAP’s decision is 
representative.  “Given Taylor, a distinction can no longer be drawn between objecting to an 
exemption itself and objecting to the value of the property subject to an exemption.  All 
objections to exemptions are subject to Rule 4003(b).  Taylor made it clear that the purpose for 
the short objection period in Rule 4003(b) is to encourage finality.  Allowing a trustee to 
distinguish between an objection to an exemption itself and the value of the property subject to 
that exemption does not promote finality.”128    Such a broad reading is inconsistent with general 
principles of statutory interpretation.  “Where Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”129  Section 
522(l) requires a party in interest to object to the property claimed as exempt.130  Conspicuously 
absent in the statute is the requirement that a party in interest object to the value of the property 
claimed as exempt.  A cursory review of the statute reveals that Congress knows how to use the 
word “value.”  In fact, the word “value” is used nine times in Section 522(d) alone.131  In 
addition, Congress also combined the words “property” and “value” in this statute on more than 
one occasion.  For example, Section 522(d)(5) the debtor may exempt his or her “aggregate 
interest in any property, not to exceed in value $1,075 plus up to $10,125 of any unused amount 
of the exemption provide under paragraph (1) of this subsection.”132  Congress specifically chose 
to include the words value and property in one section of the same statute and chose to omit the 
combination in Section 522(l).  It is therefore presumed that Congress acted intentionally and 
                                                 
128 In re Morgan-Busby, 272 B.R. 257, 265 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (citations omitted). 
129 Russello v. U.S., 463 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
130 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). 
131 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). 
132 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).   
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purposely in the inclusion of the word “property” in Section 522(l) and the exclusion of the word 
“value”.133 
The often cited canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning 
expression of the one is the exclusion of the other, is helpful to interpret Section 522(l).  “What it 
means is this: If you see a sign that says children under twelve may enter free, you should have 
no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must pay.  The inclusion of one class is an explicit 
exclusion of the other.”134  Congress spoke clearly when it included the word property and 
excluded the word value from Section 522(l).  Indeed the two objections, one to the property 
claimed as exempt and the other to the value, are separate and distinct; they each serve 
competing interests.135  The objection to property claimed as exempt gives the debtor a prompt 
determination as to his rights in property.136  In contrast, the objection to valuation allows 
creditors to obtain a fair valuation of the property for payment of their allowed claims.137   
Accordingly, because the intent of Congress is clear from the statutory text this is the end of the 
matter and the trustee does not waive an objection to the value of property if he or she fails to 
object within 30-days of the Section 341(a) meeting of creditors.138 
B.  Monetary Limitations and the Standard for Valuation of Exempt Property Preclude 
Application of Taylor in this Context. 
 
 Simply stated Taylor does not control the outcome of In re Reilly.  The Third Circuit 
understood Taylor to stand for the proposition that “where a debtor signals her intention to 
                                                 
133 See supra note 102. 
134 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
Princeton University Press) (1997).   
135 In re Hyman, 123 B.R. 342, 348 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991). 
136 Id. See also Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644 (reasoning that strictly enforcing Rule 4003’s 30-day provision may lead to 
unwelcome results, but it produces finality).   
137 Id.   
138 See generally, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  See also 
Addison v. Reavis, 158 B.R. 53, 60-61 (E.D. Va. 1993) (recognizing a distinction between objecting to property 
claimed as exempt and the value of such property claimed as exempt.  Holding that only an objection to property 
claimed as exempt must be made within Rule 4003(b)’s 30 day period).   
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exempt certain property in its entirety by listing an identical entry for the property’s value and 
the amount of the exemption, the trustee must object pursuant to Rule 4003 lest the property be 
rendered fully exempt.”139  Even assuming that a debtor signals her intention to exempt property 
in its entirety by listing an identical value for the property and the amount of the exemption, it 
does not follow that the property becomes fully exempt.  Such an interpretation not only fails to 
give effect to the language of Section 522(l), as discussed supra Part IV.A, but also fails to give 
effect to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code limiting the amount of exemptions and the 
standard for valuation.  Moreover, such an interpretation is incompatible with the policy 
underlying the Bankruptcy Code. 
1. Specific Limits Established by Congress in Section 522(d) preclude the Application of 
Taylor as Interpreted by the Third Circuit 
 
 According to the Supreme Court, statutory construction is a holistic endeavor and must 
account for the statute’s full text, language, structure and subject matter.140  It has been stressed 
that “in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”141  The Third 
Circuits’ interpretation of Taylor fails to account for the statute’s full text, its object and policy, 
specifically by ignoring the monetary limitations imposed by Section 522(d). 
 Section 522(d) places monetary limitations on certain categories of property that the 
debtor may exempt.142  For example, a debtor may exempt his or her aggregate interest, not to 
exceed $20,200 in value, in real or personal property that the debtor uses as a residence; up to 
$3,225 in one motor vehicle, $10,775 in consumer goods such as household furnishings143, and 
                                                 
139 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 179. 
140 See U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993). 
141 Id.  See also United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1849). 
142 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). 
143 But the particular item may not individually exceed $525.  11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3). 
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$2,025 in tools of the trade144  On the other hand, Congress chose to allow a debtor to exempt 
certain classes of property in full, regardless of value.  Items such as professionally prescribed 
health aids, social security benefits, unemployment compensation, alimony and support 
payments, and certain retirement funds are entirely exempt.145  The fact that Congress chose to 
include monetary limitations on certain categories of property and not others, in the same statute, 
must mean something.146  Section 522(l) should not be read to limit the application of Section 
522(d).  If Section 522(l) is interpreted to allow a debtor to exceed these monetary limitations, 
we fail to give effect to the statute’s full text, its object and policy.   
 The debtor in In re Reilly argues that if Congress had intended to limit the property 
claimed as exempt on a debtor’s schedules to the amount stated in Section 522(d), it could have 
done so expressly.147  The debtor believes that Congress’ failure to include similar limitations in 
Section 522(l) is determinative and a court should not infer that limitations exist.148  This 
argument reads Section 522(l) in isolation and fails to account for the full text of the statute, 
including Section 522(d).  “A standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical 
words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.”149  The 
Bankruptcy Code should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions; identical 
words used in different parts of the Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted to have the same 
meaning.150  This principle applies here.   
                                                 
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)-(6).  Other property also contains monetary limitations on property to be exemption 
such as the debtors interest in the cash value of a life insurance policy or payment on account of personal bodily 
injury not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(8)-(11).   
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)-(11).   
146See generally Russello v. U.S., 463 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).  
147 Brief for Respondent at 39, Schwab v. Reilly, No. 08-538 (Sept. 18, 2009).   
148 Id. at 40. 
149 Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007). 
150 See generally Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). 
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Section 522(d) lists property that may be exempted by a debtor under Section 522(b)(2), 
the federal exemptions.151  Monetary limitations are placed on certain classes of property and not 
others.152  Section 522(l) qualifies this provision and requires a debtor to submit a list of the 
property that a debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b).153  In order to file a list of property 
in accordance with Section 522(l), the debtor must first reference Section 522(b), which explains 
that a debtor may exempt from property of the estate property listed under subsection (d).  The 
debtor’s argument in In re Reilly  that if Congress had intended to limit the effect of Section 
522(l) in accordance with a value limit set forth elsewhere in the statute (i.e. Section 522(d)), 
they would have done so expressly154, is simply without merit.  Unlike debtor’s contention 
Congress did limit the effect of Section 522(l) to actual or stated values by specifically requiring 
a debtor to file a list of property claimed as exempt under subsection (b).  Subsection (b) 
specifically incorporates Section 522(d).155   Requiring Section 522(l) to expressly duplicate the 
limitations provided for in Section 522(d) would be unnecessary and cumulative.  The term 
property must be defined by reference to Section 522(d) and its attendant monetary limitations, 
otherwise identical words and phrases within Section 522 are given different meanings.  Taylor 
does not change this result. 
 Taylor must be read “as referring in context to circumstances similar to the circumstances 
then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not 
then considering.”156  The issue, as framed by the Court, was whether the trustee may contest a 
claimed exemption after the 30-day objection period has run if the debtor had no colorable basis 
                                                 
151 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). 
152 Id. 
153 11 U.S.C § 522(l). 
154 See supra note 147-48. 
155 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). 
156 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004). 
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for claiming the exemption.157  The debtor had no colorable basis for the exemption because the 
basis of the claimed exemption was a tort suit, for which no exemption exists under Section 
522(d).158  Under Taylor, it would not have mattered if the debtor listed the value of the claimed 
exemption as unknown or for one million dollars.  Regardless of the amount claimed or the fact 
that the amount claimed matched the exemption claim, the property claimed as exempt was 
improper.  There was no discussion, nor did the Court’s holding rest on the fact that a debtor 
signaled some sort of intention to exempt the property in full by listing an identical entry for the 
property’s value and amount of exemption.159 
In In re Reilly, the debtor filed a list of property that she claimed as exempt under 
subsection (b).  In order to determine what property that she was entitled to exempt under the 
statute, she referenced subsection (d), which enabled her to claim an exemption in specific 
business equipment.160  Unlike the debtor in Taylor, the exemption listed was valid and the 
trustee had no basis for objecting.  In order for the statute’s full text to be accounted for, we must 
give effect to the monetary limitations provided for in Section 522(d).  Accordingly, the debtor 
should be limited to the amount of the claimed exemption to which she was entitled, $10,718.161   
 2. Fair Market Value as the Standard for Valuation 
 The Bankruptcy Code defines value as “fair market value as of the date of the filing of 
the petition or, with respect to property that becomes property of the estate after such date, as of 
                                                 
157See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 639. 
158 See discussion supra Part II.A.  
159 See generally Taylor, 503 U.S. at 640-44.  See also In re Cormier, 382 B.R. 377, 405 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (“The 
unstated premise in Taylor is limited: when a debtor claims property as fully exempt, and no objection is timely filed, 
the property is exempt.  However, other than this remise, the Supreme court was not called upon to interpret the 
exemption statute, included § 522(d), nor did it even discuss it, except perhaps in passing.  In Taylor there is no 
statutory analysis, much less any holding, about what property is “claimed exempt” and how a debtor may claim an 
“in kind” exemption to assert the entire property as exempt.”).   
160 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174.  The debtor also claimed part of the business equipment as exempt under 
Section 522(d)(5)’s wild card provision in the amount of $8,868, an amount accounting for the value of any unused 
amount of the exemption provided under Section 522(d)(1)’s homestead exemption.  Id. 
161 In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 174.   
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the date such property becomes property of the estate.”162  Fair market value is defined as the 
price that a buyer is willing to pay and a seller willing to accept on the open market and in an 
arms length transaction.163  Because fair market value will not be determined until there is a sale 
of the property, allowing an exemption “in kind” based on the debtor’s estimated valuation of the 
property matching the claimed exemption is inconsistent with the notion that value is to be 
determined by a property’s fair market value. 
 After notice and hearing, the trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the estate.164  The 
primary role of the trustee is to liquidate the debtor’s assets in a manner that maximizes return 
for creditors.165  In order to conduct a sale a trustee must first obtain a written appraisal of the 
property, unless there is an established market for the property.166  With the court’s approval a 
trustee may employ an appraiser to assist the trustee in determining value.167  After notice and 
hearing to all interested parties the trustee may then conduct a sale through public auction or 
private sale.168  To prevent collusive bidding courts may require that the sale be publicly 
advertised.169  After sale of property, the trustee is required to file a report with the Bankruptcy 
Court that includes an itemized statement of the property sold; list of bidders; the name of the 
purchaser; the price received for each item; the date, time and place of sale; compensation paid 
                                                 
162 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). 
163 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (3rd pocket ed., 2006).  However, some courts have determined that fair market 
value must take into account the liquidation context of a Chapter 7 liquidation case and hold that fair market value is 
equivalent to liquidation value.  See generally, In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).  Cf. In re Mitchell, 
103 B.R. 819 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the appropriate valuation standard is fair market value, in 
accordance with the plain meaning of the statute).   
164 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). 
165 www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter7.html#trustee (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
166 1 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 7.47 (2d ed.). 
167 Id.  See also 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
168 1 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 7.47 (2d ed.). 
169 Id. 
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to professional person conducting sale (i.e. auctioneer); copies of sale advertisements; and a list 
of all sale expenses.170 
 Surely this procedure was not intended by Congress or the courts to be circumvented by a 
debtor’s mere listing of property and estimation of value on Schedule C.  In order to determine 
the value of the property to be exempted under Section 522(d), which is the fair market value, 
the trustee must conduct a sale or at a minimum an appraisal of the property.  Only then will 
creditors receive the process to which they are entitled for payment of their claims.  “Although 
objections to the exemptions themselves should be made as quickly as possible, the ‘objections 
to valuation, on the other hand, need not be completed with such expediency, nor should the 
creditor be required to rush out and value the debtor’s property in order to protect his interests in 
that property.’”171   
 Returning to the facts of In re Reilly, the absurdity that would result if a debtor’s estimate 
of the property’s value were to become conclusive proof of its fair market value is obvious.  In In 
re Reilly, the debtor listed her business equipment with a value of $10,718.172  The business 
equipment consisted of catering utensils and instruments.173  Unlike other types of property, such 
as stock, whose value may be determined by the stock market, or cars whose value may be 
reliably determined by reference to a website such as Kelly Blue Book, there is no readily 
established market for catering utensils and instruments.  In order to determine the true value of 
this property with no established market, it becomes increasingly important to have the 
equipment appraised by a professional or sold in a private or public auction.  Indeed, the trustee 
sought an appraisal of the business equipment in this case.  The business equipment appraised for 
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$17,200, 60% more than the value the debtor had listed for the property.174  This conclusively 
shows the fallibility of relying on a debtor’s estimation of the property, especially in undefined 
markets.  Accordingly, Congress chose to equate the value of property by reference to the fair 
market value, rather than the value estimated by the debtor.175  While a court may, in its 
discretion, accept an estimate of fair market value from the debtor, a sale or appraisal in excess 
of an estimate is significantly more reliable evidence of value as defined by Section 522(a)(2).176 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In 2008, there were 744,424 Chapter 7 filings.177  714,389 of those were individual 
filings.178  In the midst of a recession, unemployment rates at staggering numbers and an 
accompanying housing market crash we can only expect that more individuals will seek 
protection under the Bankruptcy Code.  The American Bankruptcy Institute estimates that filings 
will surpass 1.4 millions in 2009 alone.179  As more and more cases are filed each month it 
becomes imperative that a trustee is able to rely on properly submitted forms and schedules of 
the debtor.  The practical reality is that not all debtors will be entirely truthful, honest or candid.  
Requiring that a trustee objects in every instance where a debtor may have undervalued his or her 
property would bring the system to a slow crawl.180  Implementation the Eighth Circuit’s 
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decision in In re Wick will ensure that debtors and creditors are treated fairly in the system, and 
will not reward those who try and take advantage of its perceived technicalities. 
 In In re Reilly, the Supreme Court should hold that if the value of the property claimed as 
exempt exceeds the monetary limitations of Section 522(d), only to the extent of the monetary 
limitations is the property exempt, regardless if the trustee has objected within the 30-days 
provided for by Rule 4003(b).  This holding is consistent with the plain meaning of Section 
522(l), which only requires a party in interest to object to the property claimed as exempt and not 
to the valuation of that property.  In addition, this holding accounts for the Bankruptcy Code’s 
full text rather than reading provisions in isolation.  A contrary holding would disregard the 
specific monetary limitations imposed by Congress as well as the fair market value standard used 
to determine the value of exempt property.  In the end, bankruptcy is a privilege and not a right.  
A debtor’s fresh start must yield to the countervailing principle of fair distribution to creditors 
for the obligations and responsibilities incurred by a debtor. 
 
 
 
 
